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The fact that poor families often rely on informal means to manage their finan-
cial lives suggests that the formal sector is not meeting their needs.
National Poverty Center, 2008
1 Introduction
There is a large debate about the reasons why so many low-income households - 35 to 45%
in the United States - are unbanked, i.e., they possess neither a checking nor a savings
account. One question is whether being unbanked is driven by supply- or demand-side
factors (see, for instance, Bertrand et al. (2004) or Barr and Blank (2008)). The “demand-
side” view attributes the unbanked phenomenon to cultural determinants (the poor may
distrust financial institutions or may not have a culture of saving) or to a lack of financial
literacy. Alternatively, the “supply-side” view suggests that standard bank practices create
hurdles for the poor. Minimum account balances, overdraft fees, a large distance between
branches and the proliferation of formal steps to open an account result in costs that
may be too high for poor households to manage (Washington (2006), Barr and Blank
(2008)). Furthermore, bank financial services may not be tailored to low-income households.
These two polar explanations have different policy implications. Whereas the demand-side
view predicts interventions at the household level through financial literacy programs, for
example, the supply-side view suggests that banking regulation, by giving banks incentives
to change their behavior, may reduce the share of unbanked households.
This paper presents evidence that supply-side factors significantly drive the share of
unbanked households among low-income households, defined as having income below twice
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the poverty line. Similar to Rice and Strahan (2010), we exploit interstate branching dereg-
ulation in the U.S. after 1994 as an exogenous shock on bank competition. We combine
this shock with micro data on households from the Survey of Income and Program Par-
ticipation (SIPP) from 1993 to 2010 to identify low-income households with or without a
bank account (Washington (2006)). The SIPP focuses on low-income American households.
Coupled with its yearly frequency, these data are particularly well suited for our analysis.1
Our first set of empirical evidence shows that as bank competition intensifies, the share
of unbanked households decreases. We find that interstate branching deregulation is as-
sociated with a significant drop in the rate of unbanked households among low-income
populations. Figure 2 plots the change in the likelihood of holding a bank account in
the years before and after deregulation relative to a control group of states that do not
deregulate. We observe a significant increase in the share of banked households following
deregulation. Our regressions confirm this result: the share of households with a bank
account increases by 4 percentage points after a state fully deregulates.
Moreover, we show that the effect of intensified bank competition is stronger for popula-
tions that are more likely to be rationed by banks. First, we differentiate states along several
measures of discrimination. We find that black households benefit more from interstate-
branching deregulation than do non-black households only in states with a history of dis-
crimination. For the same level of income, black households are indeed 20% less likely than
white households to hold a bank account in states with a history of discrimination, but this
gap narrows to only 15% after deregulation, to the level observed in states with no history
of discrimination. Second, the effect of deregulation increases when the level of income
1Although we are not running a “horse race” between the demand-side and the supply-side views, we
focus on a clean supply shock and use a wide array of economic variables at the state and household levels
to control for demand factors.
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decreases. Whereas deregulation has no significant impact for middle-income households,
whose income is above twice the poverty line, deregulating results on average in a 2 per-
centage points increase in the probability of holding a bank account among low-income
households, and the effect increases up to 3.5 percentage points for poor households, whose
income is below the poverty line. Third, the magnitude of the effect is significantly larger
for households living in rural areas, where competition is expected to be lower ex ante.
Finally, we differentiate between households with lower and higher levels of education. We
find that the effect of deregulation is stronger for more educated households. For these
households, being unbanked is less likely to be driven by sophistication because they have
relatively high financial literacy.
Finally, we show that having access to bank accounts improves wealth accumulation
but does not translate into higher levels of indebtedness. First, deregulation increases
the share of low-income households with interest-earning assets in both banks and other
financial institutions. Second, we show that owning a bank account improves access to
credit without translating into a higher ratio of debt to income, which mitigates the fear
that banking competition fosters “predatory lending”.
Our results are robust to controlling for the demand-side factors identified in the liter-
ature. Banking deregulation, by decreasing unemployment among low-income households
through growth (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)) and easier firm access to credit (Black and
Strahan (2001), Rice and Strahan (2010)), may increase demand for bank accounts. How-
ever, in all of our specifications, we control for a large number of household covariates that
capture several dimensions of income, skills and labor status and for main state macroeco-
nomic variables that capture the effect of deregulation on GDP growth or unemployment.
In addition, we find that the effect of deregulation is not higher for households that are
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more likely to benefit from deregulation through an increase in income.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of being unbanked. This
literature has been scarce mainly as a result of the challenge of disentangling demand-side
from supply-side factors (see Barr and Blank (2008) for a broad survey of the literature).
Socio-economic characteristics, which may capture both demand- or supply-side effects, are
often noted as the most influential determinants of holding a bank account (Rhine et al.
(2006), Barr (2005), Barr et al. (2011), Hogarth and O’Donnell (1999)). On the demand
side, Kearney et al. (2010) and Cole et al. (2014) show that by offering a savings account
with lottery-like features, banks can motivate the opening of savings accounts. The debate
on the determinants of being unbanked also raises the question of the role played by the
development of alternative financial services (see, for instance, Morgan and Strain (2008),
Melzer (2011), Bertrand and Morse (2011), Morse (2011), Morgan et al. (2012), Carrell
and Zinman (2014)).
More generally, our paper relates to the literature that shows the large and positive effect
of access to banking accounts on savings rates (Ashraf et al. (2006), Schaner (2013)), on
investment in preventative health (Dupas and Robinson (2013b)) and in education (Prina
(2014)) and on starting a business (Dupas and Robinson (2013a)). Holding a bank account
can also protect households from predatory lending.
Our paper also complements the literature on the impact of bank competition on house-
hold finance. This literature has focused on implications in terms of household debt, such
as mortgages (Favara and Imbs (2014)) or credit cards (Dick and Lehnert (2010)), but not
household savings. A more developed stream of literature has used interstate and intrastate
deregulation in the U.S. to investigate the impact of bank competition on the financing of
firms (Rice and Strahan (2010), Zarutskie (2006), Cetorelli and Strahan (2006)), economic
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growth (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)) and economic volatility (Morgan et al. (2004)).
Finally, our paper adds to the literature that evaluates the effect of intensified competi-
tion on racial or gender discrimination. Increased competition has been found to reduce the
black-white wage gap in the trucking industry (Peoples and Talley (2001)), in the economy
overall (Levine et al. (2013)) and between genders (Black and Strahan (2001)). Our results
are also in line with Chatterji and Seamans (2012), who shows that credit card deregulation
expanded access to credit, particularly among blacks.2
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides theoretical explanations for
the impact of intensified bank competition on the share of unbanked households. Section
3 describes the data and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5
runs various robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Theoretical Discussion
How can bank competition increase the share of households with a bank account among
low-income populations or minorities? Several forces are potentially at play.
First, concentration in banking may lead to an excessively low supply of bank accounts
and high prices. Low-income households whose level of wealth is low are more likely to be
harmed by this lack of competition. Intensified competition should drive prices closer to
marginal cost, which should favor low-income households.
Second, intense competition may give banks incentives to cope with the higher costs
that low-income households generate. Low-income households are more likely to have low
2However, as shown by Ouazad and Rancie`re (2013), the relaxation of credit standards can also lead to
more black segregation by giving white households the opportunity to relocate in white neighborhoods.
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balances, to overdraw accounts, and may require more time from customer services, making
them less profitable as consumers. In addition, the small amount of these households’
savings and loans reduces future expected revenues. Banks may find these future revenues
excessively small relatively to the fixed cost of opening a bank account. When competition
is higher, banks have more incentives to pay this fixed entry cost.
Third, when competition intensifies, banks may have more incentives to invest in exper-
tise toward low-income populations and minorities. Acquiring expertise in offering services
to these groups may indeed partially insulate banks from pure price competition.3 More-
over, intensified competition may decrease the marginal cost of acquiring expertise because
the market size of the most efficient banks increases.
Fourth, decrease in entry barriers may give banks that already have expertise in offering
services to low-income populations or minorities access to new markets, in which such
expertise may be lacking. For example, bank expertise in offering bank accounts to black
households may be low in states with a history of discrimination. The entry of specialized
banks into these markets would induce a decrease in the share of unbanked households
among black populations.
Beyond profit-maximizing reasons for why intensified bank competition may be asso-
ciated with a decrease in the share of unbanked households, competition may also reduce
“taste-based” discrimination toward minorities. In a seminal work published in 1957, Gary
Becker argues that over the long run, competition drives discrimination out of the market-
place. The application of Becker’s model to the market for financial services can be de-
scribed in relatively general terms: banks with a “taste for discrimination” will forego
profits to indulge their desire to offer bank accounts to a specific type of depositor. For
3A similar mechanism is described in Boot and Thakor (2000). In their model, banks invest in acquiring
expertise in the market for loans through relationship banking.
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example, banks in states with a history of discrimination may offer less than the profit-
maximizing number of bank services to black households or to households living in “black
areas”. This practice in the market for loans has partly resulted in the “redlining” phe-
nomenon and was one of the main reasons for the adoption of the Community Reinvestment
Act in 1977. CohenCole (2011) finds some evidence that this practice has even persisted
in recent years. Thus, in a perfectly competitive market, non-discriminating banks should
gain a cost advantage and ultimately drive discriminating banks out of business, which
should result in a decrease in the share of unbanked households among minorities.
2.2 Banking Deregulation
Restrictions on interstate banking and branching have their historical roots in the 1789
Constitution (Johnson and Rice (2008)).4 Although the Constitution prevented states from
issuing fiat money and taxing interstate commerce, it gave them the right to charter and
regulate banks. Since then, states have used banks as a source of revenue by charging fees
for granting charters, levying taxes and owning shares. These revenues have given states
incentives to restrict competition from out-of-state banks and to create local monopolies.
In 1927, the McFadden Act implicitly prohibited interstate branching by commercial banks.
In the following years, however, bank holding companies were created to circumvent the law
and they acquired branches across states. In 1956, the Bank Holding Company Act ended
this development, preventing banks from acquiring banks or branches outside their state
unless the state of the targeted bank permitted such acquisitions. The first step toward
interstate banking came in 1978 when Maine began to allow out-of-state bank holding
4Interstate banking refers to the control by bank holding companies of banks across state lines, whereas
interstate branching means that a single bank may operate branches in more than one state without
requiring separate capital and corporate structures for each state.
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companies to acquire banks on a reciprocal basis. Other states followed beginning in 1982,
but interstate branching was still not allowed until 1994.
In 1994, the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA), also known as
the Riegel-Neal Act, effectively permitted bank holding companies to enter other states
and operate branches. However, it also allowed states to erect barriers to out-of-state entry
with regard to four dimensions: (i) the minimum age of the targeted bank (5 years, 3 years
or less), (ii) de-novo branching without an explicit agreement by state authorities, (iii) the
acquisition of individual branches without acquiring the entire bank and (iv) a statewide
deposit cap, that is, the total amount of statewide deposits controlled by a single bank
or bank holding company. Following the passage of the IBBEA in 1997, states had the
opportunity to modify each of these provisions, and many states did so. In fact, 43 states
have relaxed the protection of their banking market since then.
Following Rice and Strahan (2010), we construct a deregulation index that ranges from
0 to 4 to capture each dimension of state-level branching restrictions: 0 for fully regulated
and 4 for fully deregulated states. Therefore, an increase in the index value implies greater
competition.5
Interstate branching deregulation has fostered the development of multi-state banking.
As Figure 1 shows, not only has the total number of branches increased since 1994, but each
local market has also experienced a strong penetration of “out-of-state” branches, which
have challenged local incumbents. Analyzing the other dimension of IBBEA, the interstate
banking deregulation, Dick (2006) finds that it has translated into a dramatic decrease in
the number of regional dominant banks and a slight increase in the number of small banks,
resulting in a strong appreciation of bank density.
5We reverse Rice and Strahan (2010)’s index to facilitate the description of our results. The index takes
the value 4 before the deregulation year.
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INSERT FIGURE 1
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Household Data
Data on households comes from the SIPP and covers the 1993-2010 period. The SIPP
is a running panel that collects detailed information about income and demographics for
20,000 to 30,000 households over 2 to 3 years. Most importantly, the SIPP includes topical
modules focusing on household asset allocation and the use of banking services. We exploit
the data from these topical modules to create a dummy variable BankAccount that takes
the value 1 if at least one member in the household holds either a free checking or savings
account, and 0 otherwise.
The large size of the sample allows us to focus on low-income households, i.e., those
below 200% of the poverty threshold, which is key for our analysis because low-income
households are more likely to be rationed by banks.6 We work at the household rather
than the individual level because households often pool resources; a bank account in one
member’s name can provide access to banking services to other members of the same
household. We collapse each household observation at the year level. This leaves us with
a total sample of 135,524 low-income households living in 45 states plus the District of
Columbia over the 1993-2010 period.7
Finally, we exploit the very detailed information on socio-demographics that the SIPP
6The poverty threshold is defined in the SIPP and varies with the number of adults and children in the
household and, for some household types, the age of the household head.
7To ensure the confidentiality of the data, the SIPP aggregates five states in two groups. These states
are: Maine and Vermont (first group) and North Dakota, South Dakota and Wyoming (second group),
this explains why we do not have 50 +1 states. Unfortunately, there is a gap in the data between 2006 and
2008 because no topical module on asset allocation was administered during these years.
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provides to control for a large set of variables in our identification strategy. These controls
include family type (size of the households, whether the household head is single and
female, and whether the head is married), the socio-demographic characteristics of the
head of household (age, race, three dummies for education: elementary, high school or
college degree, employment status) and the household’s economic characteristics (monthly
income, dummy for receiving social security, dummy for transfer income).
Based on the SIPP data, we find that 36.3% of low-income households are unbanked in
1993. This rate increases up to more than 40% in 2002. We observe the same increasing
trend in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data (Table A.3). One potential explanation
would be the rapid development of alternative financial services over this period. The
2011 National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households from the FDIC indicates
that the proportion of unbanked households has also increased slightly during the recent
financial crisis.8
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for banked and unbanked households in our sam-
ple. On average, banked households are less likely to be black and to receive transfer income
and are richer than unbanked households.
INSERT TABLE 1
3.2 Identification Strategy
The baseline model estimates the effect of deregulation on the probability of holding a bank
account:
P (BankAccountist) = α+ βDeregulationst + θXist + λStateControlst + δt + ηs + ist (1)
8http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/
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where BankAccountist equals 1 if household i in state s holds a bank account at time t,
Deregulationst is the deregulation index in state s at time t, Xist is a vector of household
characteristics, StateControlst are state characteristics and δt and ηs are year and state
fixed effects, respectively. The controls at the state level come from data from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis and include state-level GDP growth, unemployment and a log of the
total population. Although our dependent variable is binary, the use of a non-linear model
such as probit or logit is not suitable given the numerous fixed effects we are using. There-
fore, following Angrist and Pischke (2008) we use a linear probability model.910 Standard
errors are clustered at the state level to account for serial correlation within states.
The parameter of interest is β, which measures the incremental effect of one step of
deregulation out of four possible steps on the likelihood of holding a bank account. State
fixed effects capture time-invariant determinants of access to banking services in each U.S.
state, such as the size of the state, the initial structure of the local banking market and
the level of education. Year fixed effects control for aggregate shocks and common trends
in access to banking services. The identification of β therefore relies on comparing the
probability of a household holding a bank account in a state before and after deregulation
relative to a control group of states that do not experience a change in regulation. All the
other regressions rely on the same identification strategy.
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients when we regress the BankAccount dummy
on both the household and state-level control variables. The coefficients have the expected
signs. Holding a diploma, whether it is from elementary school, high school or college,
increases the likelihood of holding a bank account, whereas being poor decreases it. The
9In addition, Angrist and Pischke (2008) argue that once raw coefficients from non-linear estimators are
converted to marginal effects, they offer little efficiency or precision gains over linear specifications. The
other main advantage of linear probability models is that the coefficient can be interpreted directly in term
of percentage points.
10Our results still hold in logit regressions
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coefficient on the Black dummy is -0.16, which implies that being black decreases the
likelihood of holding a bank account by 16%. Given that we control for many socio-economic
determinants, this result may suggest that black households suffer from discrimination
(see Blanchflower et al. (2003) for evidence of racial discrimination on the credit market).
Finally, the coefficients of state-level controls are not significant, which may be explained
by the fact that macroeconomic factors do not matter once we control for socio-economic
variables at the household level. To save space and facilitate the reading of the results, the
coefficients of the control variables are reported only in Table 2.
INSERT TABLE 2
One concern with our identification strategy is that we may capture the effect of the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) on unbanked households rather than the effect of
banking deregulation. The IBBEA stipulates that meeting the credit needs of communities,
as defined by the CRA, is a condition for the operation of interstate branches.11 However,
the CRA’s focus on access to credit rather than on access to basic bank accounts alleviates
this concern. In addition, even if the CRA had an effect through the IBBEA, our results
on the impact of banking deregulation would be even stronger than reported. Indeed, a
bank that wants to operate interstate branches in a newly deregulated state must meet the
requirements of the CRA in its home state. Therefore, the bank may increase the supply
of bank accounts to low-income households in its home state (the control state) before
entering the newly deregulated state (the treated state).
11The CRA was enacted in 1977 to fight the problem of “redlining” namely, the existence of discrimination
in loans and access to banking services to individuals and businesses from low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods (see, for instance, Barr (2005) for a review of the CRA and Agarwal et al. (2012) for a
recent application on the effect of CRA on bank lending).
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4 Results
4.1 Basic Model
We begin by investigating whether and to what extent banking deregulation affects the
share of unbanked households.
Table 3 reports four versions of our baseline regression, which all indicate a large and
positive impact of banking deregulation on the share of banked households. The first
column does not include any control. The coefficient on Deregulation index is 0.012 and
significant at the 1% level. That is, when a state fully deregulates, we observe an increase in
the share of households with a bank account of 4.8 percentage points. The second column
introduces household controls and the third column introduces time-varying state controls.
The coefficient on Deregulation index subsequently remains stable.
INSERT TABLE 3
Two concerns regarding endogeneity arise from our baseline model. First, the relation-
ship between banking deregulation and the share of households holding a bank account
may be subject to reverse causality. By studying the previous waves of deregulation in
the 1970s and 1980s, Kroszner and Strahan (1999) show that the timing of deregulation
is not random across states but related to interest group factors such as the prevalence
of small banks and small firms. In our case, our identification would be compromised if
for instance, the regulator responds to increasing demand for banking services. Second,
unobserved factors such as changes in economic conditions could drive both deregulation
and the demand for bank accounts.
We first address these endogeneity concerns with the large set of household and state
level controls that we introduce in our specification in the second and third columns of Table
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3. These controls aim to capture factors that foster the demand for banking services at the
household level and the economic conditions that may drive deregulation. We observe that
the coefficient of our deregulation index is even slightly reinforced.
Second, we analyze the dynamics of the share of banked households around deregulation.
Figure 2 plots the change in the likelihood of holding a bank account in the years before and
after a state deregulates (i.e., it relaxes at least two out of the four restrictions to out-of-
state entry). The figure shows that the probability of holding a bank account is relatively
high after deregulation and, most importantly, that there is no discernible pattern before
the deregulation date. The fourth column of Table 3 confirms this result. We interact four
dummy variables indicating four periods around the deregulation date with our deregulation
index: more than 3 years before, less than 3 years before, 0 to 3 years after, and more than 3
years after. We observe that only the interaction terms with the dummies indicating years
after deregulation have a positive and significant coefficient. Therefore, we observe no pre-
deregulation trend, and the share of banked households increases only after deregulation
takes place. These findings suggest that deregulation is not endogenous to the share of
unbanked households but causes an increase in the share of banked households.
INSERT FIGURE 2
Finally, in section 5.1, we investigate the timing of deregulation following the method
of Krozner and Strahan (1999) and find that deregulation does not seem to be driven
by variables that also affect access to banking services. As such, interstate branching
deregulation seems to provide a valid exogenous shock to the supply of bank accounts to
low-income households.
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4.2 Heterogeneous Treatment Effect
In this section, we investigate whether the effect of banking deregulation is higher for
households that are more likely to be rationed by banks.
Table 4 examines the impact of banking deregulation among black households. We
make the assumption that black households are more likely to be rationed by banks in
states with a history of discrimination, because we know from the literature that norms
and institutions have a long-term impact. Thus, following Chatterji and Seamans (2012),
we build four discrimination dummies that indicate states with a history of discrimination.
The first index, “slave state”, is equal to one if states allowed slavery before the civil war
of 1861-1865. The second index, “banning interracial marriages”, comes from Fryer (2007)
and identifies states that still banned interracial marriage before 1967, the date when the
US Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Loving v. Virginia repealed such anti-miscegenation
laws. The third index, “fair housing law”, is based on Collins (2004) and identifies states
that did not curb discriminatory practices by sellers, renters, real estate agents, builders,
and lenders until the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968. Finally, for the fourth index,
“interracial marriage bias”, we use the racial bias index reported in Levine et al. (2013),
which measures the difference between actual and predicted interracial marriage rates in
1970 and classifies states as above or below the median for interracial marriage bias. Not
surprisingly, the correlation between these four measures is fairly high and ranges from 40%
to more than 90%.
Table 4 reports the result of the basic model after introducing the double interaction
Deregulation ×Black in the first column, plus the triple interaction Deregulation ×Black
× Discrimination for our four discrimination dummies in the final four columns. The coef-
ficient of the double interaction Deregulation ×Black in the first column indicates whether
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the effect of deregulation is larger for black households than for non-black households. The
coefficient of the triple interaction Deregulation ×Black × Discrimination in the other
columns indicates whether the gap between black and non-black households reduces more
in states with a history of discrimination.
INSERT TABLE 4
We find that the effect of deregulation on the share of banked households is larger
among black households than among non-black households, but only in states with a his-
tory of discrimination. The first column of Table 4 shows no significant difference in the
impact of deregulation between black and non-black households, because the coefficient of
the Deregulation ×Black interaction is positive but not significant. However, the second,
third, fourth and fifth columns suggest that the effect of deregulation is larger for black
households in states with a history of discrimination. The coefficient of the triple interac-
tion Deregulation ×Black × Discrimination is always positive and significant for our four
discrimination dummies. Furthermore, the coefficient of Deregulation Index, which mea-
sures the effect of banking deregulation on non-black households, does not decrease and is
still highly significant in all the specifications of the table. This result suggests that the
large effect of deregulation on black households does not drive our main result alone and
that the entire population of low-income households also benefits from the reform. Table
A.5 in the Appendix reports the results when we split our sample along our four measures of
discrimination. We find again that the impact of deregulation is larger for black households
in states with a history of discrimination.
Next, the first three columns of Table 5 present the impact of deregulation along income
distribution and test whether the poorest households, which are more likely to be rationed
by banks’ standard practices (e.g., minimum account balance), are more impacted by dereg-
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ulation. We split our sample into three groups: poor households (below the poverty line),
low-income households (between one and two times the poverty line) and middle income
households (between two and three times the poverty line). Table 5 shows that the effect of
deregulation is higher for poor households than for low income households and that there
is no effect for middle-income households. More specifically, each step in the deregulation
index induces a 2% increase in the probability of holding a bank account among poor
households (column (1)) against a 0.9% increase among low-income households (column
(2)). By contrast, deregulation has no significant impact on middle-income households
(column (3)), which seems logical because middle-income households are less likely to face
hurdles or entry barriers to opening a bank account. The absence of a significant effect
on middle-income households also confirms that our main result does not simply capture a
general decreasing trend in the share of unbanked households in the deregulated states.
INSERT TABLE 5
Columns (4) and (5) in Table 5 focus on the heterogeneous impact of deregulation across
geographical areas. We assume here that the effect of deregulation is higher in rural areas,
where households are more likely to be rationed due to lower bank competition ex-ante. To
test this hypothesis, we split our sample into “rural” (column (4)) and “urban” households
(column (5)). We find that the coefficient of our deregulation index is twice as large for
households living in rural areas. This result is consistent with the idea that since rural
areas are more likely to be dominated by few local banks, they experience the strongest
competitive shocks.
Finally, the last two columns in Table 5 investigate whether the impact of deregulation
is larger for more educated household. Being unbanked is less likely to be driven by sophis-
tication for these households because they have a higher level of financial literacy (Lusardi
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and Mitchell, 2011). To do so, we split our sample between households with low education
in column (6) (none or only elementary) and households with at least a high school degree
in column (7). We find that the effect of deregulation appears mostly for more educated
households (column (6)).
4.3 Banking Deregulation, Asset Accumulation and Debt
This section investigates the impact of banking deregulation on households’ debt and sav-
ings. If banking deregulation results in an increase in the likelihood of holding a bank
account among low-income households, we could expect the latter not only to accumulate
more interest-earning savings given the key role of transaction accounts in asset accumula-
tion (Carney and Gale, 2001), but also to have easier access to debt financing.
Table 6 examines the detailed impact of banking deregulation on households’ savings.
The table shows estimates of the baseline model, where the dependent variables include the
two components of our BankAccount dummy. Checking, in columns (1), (3) and (4), and
Savings, in columns (2), (5) and (6), indicate whether the household holds a non-interest
bearing checking account and a savings account, respectively. The positive and significant
coefficients of the deregulation index in columns (1) and (2) show that deregulation sig-
nificantly increases the likelihood of holding both a checking and a savings account to a
similar degree. Banking deregulation may therefore foster savings accumulation on interest
bearing accounts.
When splitting the sample between poor households and low-income households in
columns (3) to (6), the coefficient of our deregulation index indicates that poor households
are much more likely to open a checking account (column (3)) than a savings account
(column (4)) following deregulation, whereas the opposite result is found for low-income
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households (column (5) and (6)). This finding is consistent with the intuition that house-
holds that are below the poverty line do not have sufficient income to accumulate savings
and that savings accounts may better meet the needs of low-income households.
The final column of Table 6 reports estimates of our basic model on a dummy indicating
whether the household has accumulated interest-earning assets in other financial institu-
tions such as savings and loans, credit unions and mutual funds. The coefficient of our
deregulation index is again positive and significant. Because we control for several income
variables in our regression, as well as state macroeconomic conditions, this result implies
that for an equal amount of income, low-income households are more likely to accumulate
wealth when they have access to bank accounts, which confirms the considerable role of
bank accounts in fostering asset accumulation.
INSERT TABLE 6
Next, Table 7 turns to the relationship between deregulation, bank accounts and house-
holds’ access to debt and investigates whether the increased probability of holding a bank
account following deregulation translates into increased access to debt. We begin by mit-
igating the risk of reverse causality in columns (1) to (3). It may be the case that in-
tensified bank competition provides banks with incentives to increase the credit supply
for low-income households and to subsequently offer them the opportunity to open bank
accounts. Column (1) focuses on the subsample of banked households and estimates the
baseline model in which where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the
household holds debt. The coefficient of the deregulation index is not significant and close
to zero, which indicates that the credit supply does not appear to increase after deregu-
lation for low-income households with a bank account. Columns (2) and (3) estimate the
baseline model in which the dependent variable is our dummy Bankaccount, but the sample
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is split into households without debt (in column (2)) and households with debt (in column
(3)). The positive and significant coefficient of our deregulation index in both columns (2)
and (3) suggests that deregulation strongly increases access to bank accounts regardless of
whether the household takes a loan.
Finally, the last column of Table 7 estimates our basic model, where the dependent
variable is the debt to income ratio. The negative but not significant coefficient of the
deregulation index indicates that deregulation has no impact on the debt-to-income ratio.
This result mitigates the fear that deregulation increases the risk of over-indebtedness.
INSERT TABLE 7
5 Robustness
5.1 The Timing of Bank Deregulation
This section strengthen the robustness of our results to several potentially confounding
influences resulting from the timing of deregulation. First, one might be concerned that the
causal link between deregulation and the share of banked households is reversed. States may
have more incentives to deregulate when the share of banked households is low. Following
deregulation, the share of banked households would then mechanically increase. Another
plausible explanation for our results is that states deregulate when their economies are
doing well and therefore when the demand for bank accounts is high, because banks are
less vulnerable to deregulation during these periods . This phenomenon would translate
into a subsequent increase in the share of banked households after deregulation.
We test whether the share of banked households or the macro-economic conditions at
the state-level drive the timing of deregulation with a Weibull proportional hazards model
21
(Kroszner and Strahan (1999)).12 The hazard rate function takes the following form:
h(t,Xt, β) = h0(t) exp[X
′
tβ], (2)
where Xt is a vector of covariates; β is a vector of unknown parameters; and the baseline
hazard rate, h0(t), is pt
p−1 with shape parameter p. The parameters β and p are estimated
with maximum likelihood. Because we consider four steps of deregulation (the amount of
bank deposits, de novo branching, the acquisition of a single branch and the minimum age
of a targeted bank), the covariates vector includes an indicator variable for each type of
deregulation. We include all state-deregulation step pairs in the analysis . We keep state-
deregulation step pairs even when the state has still not deregulated in 2010, in which case
the duration is right-censored. We are left with 204 state-deregulation step pairs of which
172 are not censored (i.e., deregulation is observed during the sample period).13 For each
state-deregulation step pair we have one observation for each year up to and including the
year of deregulation, which gives us a total of 1,773 observations.
First, to investigate whether the initial level of the share of banked households influ-
ences the timing of deregulation, we introduce three new variables: the share of unbanked
households, the share of low-income unbanked households and the share of black unbanked
households at the beginning of the period (1994). Second, to estimate the effect of macro-
economic conditions on the deregulation date we include three broad state variables: the
share of black people in the state population, the unemployment rate and real GDP per
capita. Third, we include the main variables that are used by Kroszner and Strahan (1999)
and Rice and Strahan (2010): the share of small banks in the state, their relative capital
12See Hombert and Matray (2014) for a similar exercise in the context of innovation.
13Excluding the right-censored state-deregulation step pairs from the analysis yields similar results.
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ratio, the size of the insurance sector and the share of small firms in total employment of
the state.14 Finally, we include a proxy for political ideology with a dummy “Republican”
that equals one if the majority of the voters chose the Republican candidate in the last
presidential election.
Table A.7 in the Appendix reports the results of the analysis. Reassuringly, the first
three columns indicate that the different measures of the share of unbanked households
have no significant impact on the timing of deregulation. The fourth column shows that
among the macro-economic variables, only GDP per capita has a positive and significant
coefficient, suggesting that richer states tend to deregulate earlier. The fifth column reports
the coefficients of the Krozner-Strahan variables and shows that the factors that had an
impact on the timing of intrastate deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s (Kroszner and
Strahan (1999)) also affect interstate deregulation. For instance, a larger share of small
banks delays deregulation,whereas a large insurance sector leads to earlier deregulation.
However, contrary to the first waves of deregulation, the share of small firms appears to
have no effect. Finally, column (6) shows the results when we include all of the variables
and confirms that overall, the timing of deregulation does not seem to be related to the
share of unbanked households, the share of black households, state unemployment or GDP
per capita.
14Data for the share of small banks and their relative capital ratio comes from the Call Reports. The
share of small banks is the fraction of total assets held by banks with assets below the state median, and
the relative capital ratio is the difference in the capital-to-asset ratio of small banks that of large ones.
The size of the insurance sector is defined as the ratio of value added from insurance to value added from
insurance plus banking. The share of small firms is defined as the fraction of employees in firms with
fewer than 20 employees. Data for value added come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and data for
employment by state-firm size come from the Bureau of Dynamic Statistics.
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5.2 Ruling out Demand Factors
Although the timing of deregulation seems to be exogenous to the share of unbanked
households, there may be concern that demand-side factors are driving our results.
One alternative explanation is that banking competition, by decreasing unemployment
through growth (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)) and providing easier firm access to credit
(Black and Strahan (2001), Rice and Strahan (2010)), would in fact foster the demand for
bank accounts.
However there are three facts that suggest that our result is not driven solely by de-
mand effects. First, in all of our previous specifications, we control for a large number of
covariates that capture demand effects. At the household level, we control for several di-
mensions of income, skills and labor status. At the state level, we control for the main state
macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth or unemployment. However, to strengthen
our specification, we include more detailed controls for unemployment. Table 8 reports
the results. Columns (1) and (2) show estimates of our main specification after control-
ling for whether the head of the family is unemployed or whether one of the adults in
the household is unemployed. In both cases, our result holds. Next, columns (3) and (4)
include detailed controls for unemployment at the state level. In column (3), we replace
State Unemployment with three variables: Poor Unemployment, the unemployment rate of
households living below the poverty line; low-income Unemployment, the unemployment
rate of households with an income between one and two times the poverty line; and Unem-
ployment Other Income, the unemployment rate of households whose income is above twice
the poverty line. In column (4), we decompose these three unemployment rates by race
(black and non-black), resulting in six different unemployment rates.15 In both cases, our
15To construct each unemployment rate we use the CPS (Current Population Survey). A detailed
description of how we construct the variables is provided in the Appendix.
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result holds, which mitigates the concern that our effect is driven only by demand effects
through a reduction in the unemployment rate.
Second, we consider the effect of deregulation depending on the likelihood of a household
being unemployed. If, following banking deregulation, households are more likely to find
jobs, and therefore to hold a bank account, households that are initially more at risk
of being unemployed (but have jobs) should be more affected by deregulation. To test
this prediction, we generate a predicted probability to be unemployed based on household
characteristics and location. Columns (5) and (6) present the results of splitting the sample
into households with a probability of being unemployed that is below the median and
households with a probability of being unemployed that is above the median. The effect of
deregulation is roughly the same; if anything, the point estimate of our deregulation index
for households with a lower probability of being unemployed (column 5) is slightly higher.
INSERT TABLE 8
Finally, Rice and Strahan (2010), examining the same deregulation, shows that although
the increase in competition resulted in a decrease in the cost of credit, it did not translate
into an increase in the volumes of loans. This finding suggests that deregulation had a
limited effect on demand from firms.
5.3 Evidence of Racial Discrimination across Income Groups
Given that the impact of banking deregulation on the poorest households is relatively large
and given that black households are poorer on average, our results for racial discrimination
may only reflect an income distributional effect. However, there are two reasons why this
should not be the case.
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First, we find that banking competition has an impact on the racial gap in access to
banking services only in states with a history of discrimination. This finding contradicts
the view that we simply capture a reduction in the gap between poor and middle-income
households.
Second, we show that deregulation has a larger impact on black households than on
non-black households at each point of the income distribution. We split our initial sample
into very poor (below half the poverty line), poor (between half the poverty line and the
poverty line), low-income (between one and two times the poverty line) and middle-income
households (between two and three times the poverty line). Columns (2) to (5) in Table
A.6 report the results of this decomposition and show that deregulation has an impact on
the racial gap in each income group in states with a history of discrimination. In addition,
we find no significant effect on the racial gap in the rest of the sample. These results
suggest that banking competition reduces the gap between black and non-black households
in states with a history of discrimination.
5.4 The Effect of Deregulation across Periods and States
In this section, we run a set of standard robustness checks.
First, we show that our result does not capture a general trend in the share of unbanked
households in states that deregulate. To do so, we perform a placebo test and randomly
change the date of each state deregulation in column (1) in Table 9. If the effect we are
measuring simply results from a trend, by randomly changing the deregulation date we
should still observe a positive and significant impact of deregulation. Column (1) in Table
9 shows that the coefficient of the deregulation index is no longer significant and that the
point estimate equals 0. In column (2) we re-run our baseline regression and directly add
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State x Trend control variables, such that the effect of the reform is identified purely by a
deviation from a trend that differs for each state. Column (2) indicates that such a variable
does not affect our results.
We then run two other types of robustness checks. First, we check that our results are
robust to the sample period. Column (3) starts the sample in 1997 (the date at which the
IBBEA becomes effective), and column (4) ends it in 2006 (the date before our gap in the
data). Second, we consider what happens when we use different control groups. Because
our dependent variable is an index, the identification comes both from the comparison
between states that never deregulate with states that deregulate and from the comparison
between states that deregulate more than others (for instance the comparison between
states that move from an index of 1 to 2 as opposed to a state that stays at 1). In column
(5) we replace our index with a simple dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a state
has adopted at least one of the four deregulations. By contrast, in column (6), we restrict
our sample to states that have already deregulated at least once and use our index variable
such that the identification comes purely from the increment of the index and the control
group is always composed of states that have deregulated at least once. Reassuringly, our
results hold in both cases.
Finally, in column 7, we restrict the sample to the largest 11 states (California, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania and
Texas) to ensure that our results are not driven only by small states. We find that our
results still hold.
INSERT TABLE 9
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether an intensified bank competition can have a positive
impact on the share of banked households among low-income populations. We exploit
interstate bank branching deregulation in the U.S. after 1994 as an exogenous shock. We
find that the share of unbanked households decreases in the years following deregulation.
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that supply-side factors contribute to the
unbanked phenomenon.
By examining at the impact of bank competition on access to bank accounts across
household types, we confirm the robustness of our results. We find that the effect of
intensified bank competition is stronger for populations that are more likely to be restricted
by banks. Hence, black households benefit more from deregulation than do non-black
households in states with a history of discrimination. The effect of deregulation is also
higher for households below the poverty threshold that are more likely to face entry barriers,
such as minimum account balances for opening a bank account.
We also find that this increase in the likelihood of holding a bank account improves
savings for low-income households but not their leverage, which suggests that having access
to the formal banking sector plays a role in asset accumulation for this population.
Finally, we rule out the alternative interpretation of our result that bank competition
decreases the share of unbanked households by fostering demand for bank accounts. First,
in all of our specifications, we control for a large set of covariates that capture demand effects
at both the household and state levels. Second, we find that the effect is not higher for
households that are more likely to benefit from an increase in revenue due to deregulation.
Our paper shows that an intensification of bank competition promotes access to banking
services for low-income households. It suggests that changes in banking regulation could
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impact minorities access to financial services. Because households with no bank accounts
turn to alternative financial services, this raises the question of how bank competition
interacts with this sector. We leave this question for future research.
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Figure 1. Number of Branches Operated by FDIC-insured Commercial Banks
This figure shows the number of interstate and non interstate branches operating in the U.S. over the years. Data are form
the FDIC.
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Figure 2. The Impact of Banking Deregulation on the Share of Banked House-
holds
This figure shows the relative change in odd ratios of holding a bank account around deregulation dates among low-income
households , where deregulation is defined as a state removal of at least two interstate branching restriction. The specification
is the same as equation (1) except that the deregulation index is replaced by dummy variables I(k) equal to one exactly k
years after (or before if k is negative) interstate branching deregulation. The point estimates of the dummy variables I(k)
and the 95% confidence intervals are plotted. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level.
36
B Tables
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Sample Banked Unbanked Test
Households Households
Black (%) 13 30 ***
Married Couple (%) 42 32 ***
Single Female-Headed (%) 43 50 ***
Household Size 2.5 2.7 ***
Age (year) 53 48 ***
Elementary Education (%) 22 38 ***
High School Education (%) 35 36 ***
College Education (%) 42 26 ***
Monthly Household Income 1,403 1,297 ***
Recepients of Social Security (%) 47 45 ***
Recepients of Transfer Income (%) 25 34 ***
Unemployed Head of Household (%) 7.7 9 ***
Observations 83,856 51,668 -
This table contains summary statistics on banked and unbanked low-income household socio-demographic
characteristics, SIPP (1993 - 2010). The first column displays the mean value of these characteristics for the
sample of banked households, whereas the second column displays the mean value of these characteristics for
the sample of unbanked households. The test column displays the level of statistical significance of a t-test
between the mean values of the right column minus the left column. *, **, and *** represent statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
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Table 2. Standard Determinants of Banked Households
Dependent Variable =1 if the household holds a bank account
Household Controls
Black -0.162*** (0.010)
Married Couple 0.091*** (0.006)
Single Female-Headed 0.035*** (0.006)
Household Size -0.020*** (0.002)
Age 0.004*** (0.000)
Elementary Education 0.091 (0.080)
High School Education 0.193** (0.080)
College Education 0.308*** (0.082)
Monthly Household Income 0.00*** (0.00)
Income < Poverty Threshold -0.059*** (0.005)
Receive Social Security 0.013* (0.007)
Receive transfer income -0.139*** (0.007)
Head unemployed 0.012** (0.004)
State-Year Controls
GDP Growth -0.103 (0.129)
Population -0.037 (0.132)
State Unemployment -0.003 (0.006)
Year Fixed Effects Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 136,176
This table reports a linear probability regression of household and state-year controls on access to bank
accounts. The dependent variable equals 1 if the household holds either a checking or savings account (SIPP
1993 - 2010). The regression includes state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state.
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Table 3. The Impact of Bank Deregulation on the Share of Banked Households
Dependent variable =1 if the household holds a bank account
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deregulation Index 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Deregulation (≤ t-4) -0.012
(0.016)
Deregulation (t-3,t-1) -0.012
(0.012)
Deregulation (t+1,t+3) 0.033***
(0.012)
Deregulation (≥ t+4) 0.037**
(0.017)
Household Controls - Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Controls - - Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 136,176 136,176 136,176 136,176
This table reports linear probability regressions of the Interstate Branching Deregulation Index on access to
bank accounts. The dependent variable equals 1 if the household holds a checking or a savings account (SIPP
1993 - 2010). The deregulation index ranges from 0 to 4, 0 is least, 4 is most deregulated. Column (1) does not
include any controls whereas columns (2), (3) and (4) include household controls, plus state-year controls in
columns (3) and (4). All regressions include state and year fixed effects. In column (4) the deregulation index
is split into four sub-periods: more than 3 years before deregulation, less than 3 years before deregulation,
0 to 3 years after deregulation, and more than 3 years after deregulation, where deregulation corresponds to
the removal of at least two out of the four possible restrictions. Household and state-year controls include
controls for family type, race, age, size of the household, education, receipt of Social Security income or
transfer income, monthly income and state unemployment, population (log), GDP growth and a republican
dummy. Standard errors are clustered by state.
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Table 4. The Impact of Bank Deregulation on the Share of Banked Households:
Evidence on Racial Discrimination
Dependent Variable =1 if the household holds a bank account
Discrimination Dummy - Former Antimiscegenation No Fair Share of
Slave Law Housing interacial
State Law marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Deregulation Index 0.010** 0.014** 0.012** 0.014** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Index x Black 0.009 -0.002 0.003 -0.005 -0.001
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Index x Black x Discr. 0.024** 0.019* 0.028*** 0.023***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 136,176 135,934 134,718 136,176 136,176
This table reports linear probability regressions of the Interstate Branching Deregulation Index on access to
bank accounts, its interaction with a black dummy not interacted and interacted with racial discrimination
dummy. The dependent variable equals 1 if the household holds a checking or savings account (SIPP 1993 -
2010). The deregulation index ranges from 0 to 4, 0 is least, 4 is most deregulated. From column (2) to (5)
four racial discrimination dummies are interacted first, with black, second, with black and the deregulation
index: slaves state in the year immediately prior to Civil war (1 if yes, 0 if not), anti-miscegenation law not
repealed until after the US Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Loving v.Virginia (1 if yes, 0 if no), no fair
housing law until federally mandated by the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (1 if yes, 0 if no), racial bias index, as
measured by the interracial marriage rate (1 if below median). All regressions include black*discrimination,
index*deregulation, black*deregulation controls as well as state and year fixed effects. Household and state
controls include controls for family type, race, age, size of the household, education, receipt of Social Security
income or transfer income, monthly income, unemployed status and state unemployment rate, population
(log), GDP growth and a republican dummy. Standard errors are clustered by state.
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Table 5. Heterogenous Effect of Bank Deregulation across Household Types
Dependent Variable =1 if the household holds a bank account
Income Group Residence Education
Sample Poor Low Middle Rural Urban High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Deregulation Index 0.016*** 0.010** 0.003 0.018*** 0.010* 0.012** 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 52,470 83,706 48,343 37,550 98,626 97,873 38,303
This table investigates the effect of banking deregulation on access to bank accounts across various types of
households. In columns (1) to (3) we split the sample into three groups based on income level: “Poor” is
below the poverty line, “Low” is between once and twice the poverty line and “Middle” is between two and
three times the poverty line. Columns (4) and (5) split between households living in rural and urban areas.
Columns (6) and (7) split the sample between low educated (less than high school) and highly educated (high
school or higher) households. Household and state controls are the same as previously described. Standard
errors are clustered by state.
41
Table 6. The Effect of Bank Deregulation on Asset Accumulation
Dependent variable =1 if the household holds
Checking Savings Checking Savings Savings in o.
Account Account Account (only) Account Institutions
Sample All All Poor Low Inc. Poor Low Inc. All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Deregulation Index 0.007** 0.006*** 0.014*** 0.008* 0.004 0.009** 0.093**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.038)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 136,176 136,176 38,737 46,282 52,470 83,706 135,818
This table reports the effect of the Interstate Branching Deregulation Index on asset accumulation. In columns
(1) to (6) the dependent variable is dichotomous and takes the value 1 if the household owns a non interest
bearing checking account (columns (1) and (3)-(4)), a savings account (columns (2) and (5)-(6)) and interest
earning assets in financial institutions other than a bank in column (columns (7)). We also split the effect of
owning a checking and savings account across income groups. “Poor” is below the poverty line and “Low” is
between once and twice the poverty line. Household and state controls are the same as previously described.
Standard errors are clustered by state.
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Table 7. The Effect of Bank Deregulation on Debt
Dependent variable =1 if the household holds Debt to Income Ratio
Debt Bank Account
Sample Banked Debt-free In debt All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deregulation Index 0.001 0.014*** 0.007** 0.013
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.020)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 84,089 63,039 72,660 135,699
This table reports the effect of owning a bank account on access to debt. We estimate linear probability
regressions in which dependent variables are dichotomous variables that take the value 1 if the household
owns debt in column (1), a bank account in columns (2) and (3) and the debt to income ratio in columns (4).
The deregulation index ranges from 0 to 4, 0 is least, 4 is most deregulated. All regressions include state and
year fixed effects. Household and state controls are the same as previously described. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level.
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Table 8. Ruling Out Demand Factors
Dependent variable =1 if the household holds a bank account
Sample Total Sample Likely unemployed Not likely unemployed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deregulation Index 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Head Unemployed 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Any Family Member Unemployed 0.017***
(0.004)
Unemployment Poor -0.086*
(0.051)
Unemployment Low Income -0.037
(0.095)
Unemployment Other Income -0.077
(0.313)
Unemployment Poor Black 0.014
(0.013)
Unemployment Low Income Black 0.037
(0.024)
Unemployment Poor No Black -0.148**
(0.059)
Unemployment Low Income No Black -0.098
(0.110)
Unemployment Other Income Black 0.011
(0.063)
Unemployment Other Income No Black -0.036
(0.356)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 135,524 135,524 135,524 135,524 135,524 135,524
This table reports the effect of Interstate Branching Deregulation Index on the likelihood to have a bank
account depending on various measure of the unemployment rate in the the state of location. In column (5)
and (6), we estimate the probability to be unemployed based on household and state characteristics and split
the sample between households with a probability below the median sample (column (5)) and above median
sample (column (6)). Standard errors are clustered by state.
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Table 9. Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable =1 if the household holds a bank account
All Periods States
Sample After Before All Only Largest
1997 2005 Deregulated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Placebo -0.002
Index (0.004)
Deregulation 0.011** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.011** 0.014**
Index (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Deregulation 0.020*
Dummy (0.012)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State*Year Trend - Yes - - - - -
Observations 135,524 135,524 107,464 112,029 135,524 96,845 72,716
This table reports results from linear probability model regressions on access to bank accounts. Columns (1)
and (2) and (5) include the whole sample. In columns (3) and (4) data are split into two sub-periods: (1997-
2010) and (1993-2006). In column (6) the sample is restricted to states with at least one deregulation over the
1993-2010 period, and in column (7) to the largest 10 states. The dependent variable is 1 if the household holds
a checking or a savings account (SIPP 1993 - 2010). The explanatory variable is the deregulation index in each
column, except in column (1) and in column (5). In column (1) the dependant variable is a placebo index. In
column (5) the dependant variable is a dummy with value 1 if the deregulation index is strictly higher than 0.
All regressions include state and year fixed effects. Column (2) also includes state*trend effects. Household
and state controls include controls for family type, race, age, size of the household, education, receipt of Social
Security income or transfer income, monthly income, unemployed status and state unemployment, population
(log) and unemployment rate. Standard errors are clustered by state.
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Appendix A Tables
Table A.1. State Interstate Branching Laws: 1994-2010
This table shows for every state the year in which the deregulation reforms came into effect and gives the
deregulation index resulting from these changes. The index ranges from 0 to 4, 4 indicating maximum openness
to out-of-state branching.
State Effective No Allows Allows Deposit Index
Year Minimum Age De Novo Single Branch cap higher
on target Branching Acquisition than 30%
Alabama 1997 0 0 0 1 1
Alaska 1994 0 0 1 1 2
Arizona 1996 0 0 0 1 1
Arizona 2001 0 0 1 1 2
Arkansas 1997 0 0 0 0 0
California 1995 0 0 0 1 1
Colorado 1997 0 0 0 0 0
Connecticut 1995 0 1 1 1 3
Delaware 1995 0 0 0 1 1
DC 1996 1 1 1 1 4
Florida 1997 0 0 0 1 1
Georgia 1997 0 0 0 1 1
Georgia 2002 0 0 0 1 1
Hawaii 1997 0 0 0 1 1
Hawaii 1997 1 1 1 1 4
Idaho 1995 0 0 0 1 1
Illinois 1997 0 0 0 1 1
Illinois 2004 1 1 1 1 4
Indiana 1997 1 1 1 1 4
Indiana 1998 0 1 1 1 3
Iowa 1996 0 0 0 0 0
Kansas 1995 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 1997 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 2000 1 0 0 0 1
Kentucky 2004 1 0 0 0 1
Louisiana 1997 0 0 0 1 1
Maine 1997 1 1 1 1 4
Maryland 1995 1 1 1 1 4
Massachussets 1996 1 0 0 1 2
Michigan 1995 1 1 1 1 4
Minnesota 1997 0 0 0 1 1
Mississipi 1997 0 0 0 0 0
Missouri 1995 0 0 0 0 0
Montana 2001 0 0 0 0 0
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Table A.2. State Interstate Branching Laws: 1994-2010 (End)
This table shows for every state the year in which the deregulation reforms came into effect and gives the
deregulation index resulting from these changes. The index ranges from 0 to 4, 4 indicating maximum openness
to out-of-state branching.
State Effective No Allows Allows Deposit Index
Year Minimum Age De Novo Single Branch cap higher
on target Branching Acquisition than 30%
Nebraska 1997 0 0 0 0 0
Nevada 1995 0 1 1 1 3
New Hampshire 1997 0 0 0 0 0
New Hampshire 2000 0 1 1 1 3
New Hampshire 2002 1 1 1 1 4
New Jersey 1996 1 0 1 1 3
New Mexico 1996 1 0 0 0 1
News York 1997 0 0 1 1 2
North Carolina 1995 1 1 1 1 4
North Dakota 1997 1 0 0 0 1
North Dakota 2003 1 1 1 0 3
Ohio 1997 1 1 1 1 4
Oklahoma 1997 0 0 0 0 0
Oklahoma 2000 1 1 1 0 3
Oregon 1997 0 0 0 0 1
Pennsylvania 1995 1 1 1 1 4
Rhode Island 1995 1 1 1 1 4
South Carolina 1996 0 0 0 1 1
South Dakota 1996 0 0 0 1 1
Tennessee 1997 0 0 0 1 1
Tennessee 1998 0 0 1 1 2
Tennessee 2001 0 1 1 1 3
Tennessee 2003 0 1 1 1 3
Texas 1995 0 1 1 0 2
Texas 1995 0 0 0 0 0
Texas 1999 1 1 1 0 3
Utah 1995 0 0 1 1 2
Utah 2001 0 1 1 1 3
Vermont 1996 0 0 1 1 2
Vermont 2001 0 1 1 1 3
Virginia 1995 1 1 1 1 4
Washington 1996 0 0 0 0 1
Washington 1996 0 1 1 1 3
West Virginia 1997 0 1 1 0 2
Wisconsin 1996 0 0 0 1 1
Wyoming 1997 0 0 0 1 1
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Table A.3. Percent of Unbanked Households by Data Source and Year
This table reports the share of unbanked households. Percentages are authors’ calculations except for the
1994 Panel Study and Income Dynamics one, which is from Hogarth and O’Donnell (1999).
Year Survey of Panel Study SIPP
Income and of Income (low-income
Program Participation Dynamics Households)
1993 16.4 36.3
1994 16.5 22 35.5
1995 16.8 35.6
1996 17.8 36.8
1997 19.2 39.2
1998 19.1 38.6
1999 19.4 23.3 38.8
2000 19.5 38.5
2001 20.1 24.8 38.6
2002 21.4 40.6
2003 22.4 25.7 40.6
2004 19.0 38.6
2005 18.6 25.8 36.7
2009 19.0 26.9 36.7
2010 20.6 38.4
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Table A.4. The Impact of the Four Provisions on Interstate Branching Dereg-
ulation on the Share of Banked Households
This table reports Logit regressions of the Interstate Branching Deregulation Index on access to banking
services. The dependent variable equals 1 if the household has access to a checking or savings account (SIPP
1993 - 2010). The deregulation index ranges from 0 to 4, 0 is most, 4 is least restricted. Column (1) does not
include any controls whereas columns (2), (3) and (4) include Household controls, plus State-Year controls
in columns (4) and (5). In column (5) the deregulation index is split into four sub-periods. All regressions
include state and year fixed effects. Household and State-Year controls include controls for family type, race,
age, size of the household, education, receipt of Social Security income or transfer income, monthly income,
car or home ownership and state unemployment, population (log) and unemployment rate. Standard Errors
are clustered by state.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deposit Cap 0.002
(0.013)
De Novo Branching 0.031**
(0.014)
Minimum Age 0.024*
(0.014)
Single Branching 0.037***
(0.009)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 135,524 135,524 135,524 135,524
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Table A.5. The Impact of Bank Deregulation on the Share of Banked House-
holds: Evidence on Racial Discrimination (2)
This table reports logit regressions of the Interstate Branching Deregulation Index and its interaction with
black on access to banking services. The dependent variable equals 1 if the household has access to a checking
or savings account (SIPP 1993 - 2010). The deregulation index ranges from 0 to 4, 0 is most, 4 is least
restricted. For each set of regressions, the data are split into two mutually exclusive samples: slave state in
the year immediately prior to the Civil War (yes or no), anti-miscegenation law not repealed until after the US
Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Loving v.Virginia (yes or no), no fair housing law until federally mandated
by the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (yes or no), racial bias rate, as measured by the interracial marriage rate
(below or above median). All regressions include state and year fixed effects. Household and state controls
include controls for family type, race, age, size of the household, education, receipt of Social Security income
or transfer income, monthly income, unemployed status and state unemployment, population (log), GDP
growth and a republican dummy. Standard Errors are clustered by state.
Slave Antimisce No Fair Share of
Territory -genation Housing Law interacial
Law marriage
No Yes No Yes No Yes >Median <Median
Deregulation Index 0.031 0.049 0.041 0.042 0.015 0.067** 0.046* 0.060*
(0.030) (0.030) (0.026) (0.034) (0.039) (0.028) (0.027) (0.033)
Index x Black -0.020 0.100*** 0.004 0.101*** -0.032 0.110*** -0.020 0.109***
(0.041) (0.027) (0.038) (0.026) (0.033) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 65,472 69,810 76,261 57,805 66,439 69,085 77,960 57,564
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Table A.6. Racial Discrimination Across Income Groups
In this table, data are split into four exclusive samples of households based on their annual income: very poor
(below half the poverty line), poor (between half and once the poverty line), low-income (between once and
twice the poverty line) and middle income households (between twice and three times the poverty line). In
column (1) we estimate logit regressions of the Interstate Branching Deregulation Index on access to banking
and its interaction with a poor household (including very poor households) dummy and with a low-income
household dummy. In column (2) to (5) we estimate logit regressions of the Interstate Branching Deregulation
Index on access to banking and its interaction with black and a discrimination dummy (No Fair housing law)
on each sample. The dependant variable is 1 if the household has access to a checking or savings account (SIPP
1993 - 2010). The deregulation index ranges from 0 to 4, 0 is most, 4 is least restricted. Regressions in columns
(2) to (5) include black x discrimination, index x deregulation, black*deregulation controls. Household and
State controls include controls for family type, race, age, size of the household, education, receipt of Social
Security income or transfer income, monthly income, unemployed status and state unemployment, population
(log) and unemployment rate. Standard Errors are clustered by state.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Poor+Low+Middle Very Poor Poor Low Income Middle Income
Income Households Households Households Households Households
Deregulation Index -0.012 0.090** 0.072* 0.069** 0.037
(0.022) (0.036) (0.039) (0.034) (0.035)
Index x Poor 0.103***
(0.022)
Index x Low Income 0.067***
(0.014)
Index x Black 0.147** 0.142*** 0.150*** 0.135*
x Discrimination (0.072) (0.049) (0.049) (0.075)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 183,693 17,989 34,261 83,274 48,169
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Table A.7. Addressing Endogeneity Concerns: What Drives Bank Deregula-
tion?
The hazard model is Weibull, where the dependent variable is the log expected time to deregulation. All
variables are measured for each state in each year. The share of unbanked households, low-income unbanked
households or black unbanked households are measured at the state level in 1994. The share of black people
in the state population, unemployment rate and real GDP per capita is at the state-year level. Share of small
banks is the percent of banking assets in the state held by banks below the median size of banks in each
state in each year. Relative capital ratio of small banks is the capital to assets ratio of small banks minus
that of large banks. Relative size of insurance relative to banking plus insurance in the state is measured as
gross state product from insurance divided by gross state product from insurance plus banking. Republican
is equal to one if the majority of the voters chose the Republican candidate in the latest presidential election.
Duration Model for the Time until Deregulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of unbanked households -1.983 -4.057
(1.948) (3.378)
Share of unbanked among the low income -4.252
(2.777)
Share of unbanked among the black 0.359
(3.456)
Share of black households -0.259 1.822
(1.486) (2.875)
Unemployment 0.118 0.247
(0.121) (0.190)
GDP per capita 0.032** 0.014
(0.014) (0.022)
Republican -0.133 0.278
(0.370) (0.434)
Share of small banks -19.37*** -17.513***
(5.528) (6.576)
Relative capital ratio of small banks 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Relative size of insurance 1.010*** 1.113***
(0.377) (0.352)
Observations 1,773 1,773 1,773 1,773 1,773 1,773
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Appendix B Variables Definitions
State-level variables
State GDP Growth: annual growth rate in gross state product (GSP) using data obtained
from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis Region Tables.
Population: log of total state population from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis Re-
gion Tables.
State Unemployment: the state unemployment rate, obtained from the U.S. Bureau of La-
bor Statistics.
CPS Data
To construct unemployment rate by racial and income categories, we use publicly-available
microdata from IPUMS-CPS (Ruggles et al. 2010) for the years 1994 to 2010. We select
the sample as follow. We drop the population not in the labor force (labforce = 13) and
in military (empstat=13) and keep persons between the age of 16 and 64. We identify
families below the poverty line if their total family income ftotval is below the threshold
given by the CPS (variable cutoff). Finally, we collapse the data at the state-year level
using population weight wtsupp.
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